CITIZEN = SUBJECT
AMERICAN = ENGLAND
By The Informer
Before getting into the case at hand you MUST understand a little known concept in English writing and the legal term and use of certain words by the court. Failure to understand will result in a poor reading of the case. And, in fact all other cases you read. That is why there is so much misunderstanding amongst people when they read a case. I can read a case and get an entirely different set of facts that most all people do not see. Most people are after a specific thing in a case to prove a point and miss a lot of good material.
Commas are a very important piece of understanding a sentence.
COMMA.n. A segment, to cut off. In writing and printing, this point [,]denoting the shortest pause in reading, and separating a sentence into divisions or members, according to the construction. Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary
RULES OF PUNCTUATION–COMMAS THAT SET OFF.
4.1.1 Commas usually set off words, phrases, and other sentence elements that are parenthetical or independent. Items of this sort are contrasting expressions. <Work, not words, is what is needed.>
4.1.2 Commas usually set off appositional or modify words, phrases, or clauses that do not limit or restrict the main idea of a sentence. <We leave at three O’clock, when the bell rings.>
4.2.2 Whenever in spoken English there is an enumeration of items, a rising or sustained pause separate and distinguishes each member of a series. In writing, a comma likewise separates words, phrases or clauses that occur in a series.<He opened the can, removed the contents, and replaced the lid.>
4.4.2 It is equally important to insert a comma to prevent misreading or ambiguity. <As the car struck, the utility pole fell with a crash.>
WEBSTER’S SEVENTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 1970 PUNCTUATION
So you can see just how important commas are and where they are placed in a sentence. You may want to refer to this when reading the case.
Now we come to an all important word that when in law means something entirely different than what you think it means and the courts are well aware of this when they read legal briefs or write determinations. Something the average writ writer has no clue as to how he is using the word. That word is the simple word “OR”. Did you know that the word OR means AND unless a specific word is used in conjunction with it in LAW?
Standard definition Webster’s Dictionary.
OR. Conj.. Used as a function word to indicate an alternative.
So it is a conjunction.
CONJUNCTION. The state of being conjoined; occurrence together in time or space; connective.
Therefore, it can mean the word on either side of “or” are one and the same.
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 3rd edition. 1969
OR. A conjunction normally in the disjunctive. A conjunction properly used with “either” in stating a proposition in the alternative.
BLACK’S LAW 4th ED
OR, conj.. A disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things. It is also used to clarify what has already been said, and in such cases, means ‘in other words,’ ‘to wit,’ or ‘that is to say.’ Or is frequently misused; and courts will construe it to mean ‘and’ where it is so used. However, where the word ‘or’ is preceded by the word ‘either,’ it is never given a conjunctive meaning.
Now you are going to see how important that little word is, as well as the comma. Here I just gave you a prime example that the comma in the preceding sentence separated two independent things, word and comma. Look at punctuation rule 4.2.2 and 4.4.2. Apply it to all other law and you will be shocked that you have probably misread or misconstrued every law and case that you have seen. Now I have given you a second example in the preceding sentence where I used the word OR to mean AND. Since I did not use the word either in the sentence the word misread, OR means AND. And you wonder why these kids from age 35 back to age 18 have no concept of what they read and can’t understand a thing about the world today when it comes to a simple contract? And you wonder why I and only a few other researchers see what you don’t see in law or court cases and say we are wrong because you don’t understand punctuation or the word Or means AND?
Hopefully I will not have to explain after you read the case. You will pick up on the fact that the term citizen of the United States was used well before the 14th Amendment was ever adopted, like pre 1824. You will see that the word ‘either’ NEVER appears in the decision. However you will see the word ‘neither’ used twice. Remember sentence construction from 6th grade where the “neither nor” rule applied like the “either or rule?” How many remember being taught that like I was?
You will see that citizen subject is one in the same and is what I have been saying since 1990. So you are not and never were a sovereign. Also you will see that they, the sovereigns, your rulers, can naturalize every man woman and child when an area joins the Union in one fell swoop. The people did not join the Union as only fictions called States can join the Union.
This case shows where one can be
a subject (citizen) of a state and still not be a citizen of the United States
despite the 14th Amendment. All the 14th did was to put all under the military
rule and was designed for corporations as evidenced by the fact the first time
it was used to defend a black man was in the early 1930’s. Come on now, from
1868 to 1933 that no case ever used it for a man, either white or black, should
tell you something. In here you will see that those sovereigns give subjects
(citizen) only privileges and it is considered a GIFT. Yes you will catch it
when reading. Keep searching for the word RIGHTS as you read the case. Are they
natural or conferred? Also, if all the so-called “Christians” use the definition
as a follower of “Christ,” then they are not “Christians.” When you read what
you have to give up to become a SUBJECT (citizen) of another sovereign and
renounce all allegiance, I dare say we have no “Christians” in America
whatsoever, save a very, very, few. It is all hype as they are all fence
sitters. And they wonder why the Lord Almighty doesn’t come down and clean the
mess up? Because they are a big part of the mess. Look how many call themselves
citizens of the United States or a citizen of the political subdivision of the
corporate United States, namely a State? Look for the dates April 14,
1802 & March 3, 1863, (12 Stat. 731,) and see what they declared
way before the 14th Amendment. Yes dear reader, read this case well especially
since I highlighted those words and punctuation for clarity. Now after reading
this, do you think all those tons of cases you read have to be reread because
the courts are not taking them with any seriousness because you misread them? I
wonder what they really said in all those cases? Especially since after reading
this case you will immediately see where you placed yourself, by claiming the
Constitution is yours. And you probably said, I took an oath to defend
it, even though it is not protecting me like I thought it said and by golly, as
a citizen of this great state of the Union I am not a United States citizen,
even though I voted either for or against Clinton. Now look what the court
stated it had claiming jurisdiction over this alien because of what he did, not
whom he said he was. Make sure you find the word “contract” in the decision.
Every time you see “or” replace it with “AND”. As I have said all
along, especially in my New History of America, we are nothing but slaves
on the Plantation, never were the sovereigns you thought you were, and have no
control over any State officer of the corporation although they like you to
think you do. The Constitution they speak of is all rhetoric and meaningless.
Plantation does not mean a farm either. So with all this knowledge of English
and punctuation lets read what I scanned.
THE
FEDERAL REPORTER.
VOLUME 56.
CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED
IN THE
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS AND CIRCUIT
AND .DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES.
PERMANENT EDITION,
JULY–OCTOBER, 1893,
WITH TABLES OF FEDERAL REPORTER CASES PUBLISHED IN
VOLS. 3, C. C. A. REPORTS; 4, U.S. APPEALS REPORTS
A TABLE OF STATUTES CITED AND CONSTRUED IS
GIVEN IN THE INDEX
ST. PAUL:
WEST
PUBLISHING CO.
1893.
Pg 576 FEDERAL REPORTER, vol 56.
CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS v. REUM.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. May 29,
1893.)
No. 211
1. ALIENS–Who Are–EFFEC’T OF STATE LAWS.·
A foreign-born resident of the United States, who
has merely declared his intention to become a citizen, but has never complied
with any other provision of the naturalization laws, is none the less an alien
because of the fact that the constitution and laws of Minnesota, wherein he
resides, have conferred the elective franchise and other privileges of
citizenship on foreign subjects who have declared their intention to be
naturalized, and that he has actually voted for member of congress and state and
county officers.
2. SAME–Naturalization Laws. ·
Nor is his status altered by reason of the fact that, when he
so declared his intention, he was entitled, by reason of length of residence, to
be naturalized, under Rev. St. § 2167, for that section merely dispenses with
the two-year delay between the declaration of intention and the actual admission
to citizenship which is prescribed by section 2165.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Minnesota. Affirmed.
Statement by SANBORN, Circuit Judge:
On October 7, 1891, Frederick Reum, the defendant in error, brought this action against the city of Minneapolis, the plaintiff in error, for a personal Injury that resulted from its negligence. He recovered Judgment, to reverse which this writ of error was sued out. In his complaint he alleged that he was an alien, and a subject of the King of Saxony, and this allegation was denied by the defendant. The evidence disclosed these facts: The plaintiff was born in the kingdom of ‘Saxony in 1859. His father and mother were natives of that kingdom, and the former resided there until he died, in the Infancy of the plaintiff. In 1863, after his father’s death, the Plaintiff and his mother came to the state of Minnesota, where they have since resided. In 1885 he was married, and has since that time owned and occupied a farm in that state. On October 25, 189O, he made a declaration of his Intention to become a citizen of the United States in the circuit court for the district of Minnesota; but he has never been admitted, or applied to be admitted, to citizenship under the second and third paragraphs of .section 2165 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, or under any provisions of the acts of congress. The state of Minnesota has conferred upon all foreign subjects resident within its borders who have declared their intention to become citizens the elective franchise, the privilege of holding any office within its gift, and practically all of the privileges of citizenship in the power of that state to confer. In November 1890, the plaintiff voted for a member of congress and for state and county officers in Minnesota. At the close of the evidence the defendant moved the court to dismiss the action for want of Jurisdiction, on the ground that the evidence failed to establish the allegation that the plaintiff was an alien. The court denied the motion, and this ruling is the supposed error assigned.
David F. Simpson, (Robert D. Russell, on the brief,)
for plaintiff in error.
John W. Aretander,
for defendant in error.
Before CALDWELL and SANBORN, Circuit Judges, and THAYER, District Judge.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge, (after stating the facts as
above.) In Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425, Mr. Justice Miller, who was then
presiding in the circuit court for the district of Minnesota, held that a state
could not make the subject of a foreign government a citizen of the United
States, and that a resident of Minnesota who was born a subject of the grand
duke of Mecklenburg, had declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States many years before he brought his suit, had resided in the state of
Minnesota for 15 years, had several times voted at elections held in that state
where the constitution of the state authorizes such residents to do so without
naturalization, but had never applied to be or been admitted to citizenship
under the federal naturalization laws, was still an alien, and a subject of the
grand duke of Mecklenburg. This decision has been followed by the courts, and
acquiesced in by the profession. It is now vigorously challenged by counsel for
plaintiff in error.
Section 2, art. 3. of the Constitution of the United states, provides that the
judicial power of the nation shall extend to “controversies between a state or
the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects;” and the acts of
Congress of March 3, 1887, (24 Stat.552,) and of August 13, 1888, (25 Stat.
433,) confer jurisdiction of all these controversies in cases involving over
$2,000 upon the circuit courts. Every person at his birth is
presumptively a citizen or subject of the state of his nativity,
and where, as in the case at bar, his parents were then both subjects of
that state, the presumption is conclusive. To the land of his birth he owes
support and allegiance, and from it he is entitled to the civil and
political rights and privileges of a citizen or subject. This
relation, imposed by birth, is presumed to continue until a change of
nationality is proved. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 167; Vatt. Law Nat. p.
101; Morse, Nat. 61, 125. A change of nationality cannot be made by the
individual at will. Each nation has the right to refuse to grant the rights and
privileges of citizenship to all persons not born upon its soil, and, if it
determines to admit them to those rights and privileges, it may fix the
terms on which they shall be conferred upon them. Naturalization is
the admission of a foreign subject or citizen into the political body of
a nation, and the bestowal upon him of the quality of a citizen or
subject.
The
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that “all
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside.” As the plaintiff was born in the kingdom of Saxony, of parents who
at the time of his birth were subjects of the king of Saxony, he is not a
citizen of the United States unless he has been naturalized therein. The United
States, in the exercise of their undoubted right, have prescribed the conditions
upon compliance with which an alien may become a citizen of this nation. The act
of Congress of April 14, 1802, (2 Stat. 153, c. 28, § 1; Rev. St. §
2165,) provides that “an alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the
United States in the following manner, and not otherwise. First. He shall,
two Years at least prior to his admission, declare before a proper court his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce his
allegiance to the potentate or sovereignty of which he may be at the
time a citizen or subject. Second. He shall, at the time of his
application to be admitted, declare, on oath, before some one of the courts
above specified, that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and
that he absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance and
fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty; and
particularly, by name, to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which
he was before a citizen or subject, which proceedings shall be recorded
by the clerk of the court. Third. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction
of the court admitting such alien that he has resided within the United States
five years at least, and within the state or territory where such court is at
the time held one year at least and that during that time he has behaved as a
man of a good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of
the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the
same; but the oath of the applicant shall in no case be allowed to prove his
residence.”
By the act of May 26,
1824, (4: star. 69, c. 186, § 1; Rev. St. § 2167,) it is provided
that:
“Any alien, being
under the age of twenty-one years, who has resided In the United States three
years next preceding his arriving, at that age, and who has continued to reside
therein to the time he may make application to be admitted a citizen thereof,
may, after he arrives at the age of twenty-one years, and after he has resided
five years within the United States, including the three years of his minority,
be admitted a citizen of the United States, without having made the
declaration required in the first condition of section twenty-one hundred and
sixty-five; but such alien shall make the declaration required therein at the
time of his admission, and shall further declare on oath, and prove to the
satisfaction of the court, that, for two years next preceding, it has been his
bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States; and he shall in
all other respects comply with the laws in regard to naturalization.
There is no other provision of
the acts of congress under which this plaintiff could have been naturalized. The
counsel for plaintiff in error, however, alleges that he became a citizen of the
United States (1).because at the time he declared his intention to do so he
might have been admitted to citizenship, under the provisions of section 2167;
(2) because various acts of congress have conferred certain privileges, and some
have conferred all the privileges, of a citizen upon foreign-born
residents who had declared their intention to become citizens; and (3) because
the state of Minnesota has granted to such residents practically all the
privileges of citizenship in its power to bestow.
Before this plaintiff could become a
naturalized citizen, the contract of allegiance and protection that the
relation of a citizen to his nation implies must be made between him and the
United States. The United States have prescribed the conditions under which such
an alien may make this contract, the place where, and the manner in
which, it shall be made, and have declared that it can be made on those
conditions, and in that manner, and not otherwise. Rev. St. § 2165. The
conditions are that he shall declare on oath, that he will support the
Constitution; that he does renounce all allegiance to every foreign
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to that one of
which he was a subject; that it shall be made to appear to the court that he has
resided in the United States five years, and in the state where the court is
held one year; that he has behaved as a man of good moral character during all
of this time, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United
States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. The place
where these conditions must be complied with is in one of the courts of record
named in the acts of Congress, and the method by which the contract is to be
made is by plenary proof to that court of a compliance with these
conditions, which must be evidenced by its judgment. The plaintiff has complied
with none of these terms. He has not even applied to any court to be admitted to
citizenship. He has not consented to become a citizen of the United States on
the terms they offer to him, or on any terms, but he still insists he is not a
citizen, and that he is still a subject of the king of Saxony. On the other
hand, the United States have not consented to accept the plaintiff as a citizen,
on any terms, much less to waive all the essential conditions without a
compliance with which Congress has declared an alien cannot be naturalized.
The minds of both parties must meet to make a contract, and, where neither
party consents, there can surely be no agreement.
That the plaintiff, on October 25, 1890,
had resided in Minnesota, as boy and man, long enough to qualify him to become a
citizen under section 2167, is not material. The conclusive answer to the
argument here urged is that the declaration of an intention to enter into a new
relation for whom parties are qualified does not establish the relation. A man
and woman who declare their intention to be married at some future time do not
thereby become husband and wife. On the other hand, a declaration of intention
to enter into a relation or to do an act at some future time is very persuasive
evidence that the relation was not entered upon, and the act was not done, at
the time the declaration was made. It must be borne in mind that the only effect
of section 2167 was to relieve the plaintiff from waiting two years after filing
his declaration before being admitted to citizenship. That section expressly
provides that in all other respects he shall comply with the laws in regard to
naturalization. The plaintiff’s declaration on October 25, 1890, when he was
qualified to be naturalized, that he intended at some future time to become a
citizen, coupled with the fact that he did not then apply to be admitted to
citizenship, nor comply with any of the conditions prescribed by law for his
naturalization, compels the conclusion that he did not then denationalize
himself, but that he still remained a foreign subject. That Congress, in various
acts, has conferred certain privileges and imposed certain burdens upon “persons
of’ foreign birth who shall have declared their intention to become citizens,”
at the same time that it conferred like privileges or imposed like burdens upon
our own citizens, as in the act of March 3, 1863, (12 Stat. 731,) where all
able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and “persons of
foreign birth who shall have declared their intention to become citizens under
and in pursuance of the laws thereof,” between certain ages, are declared to
constitute the national forces, and as in the patent laws, (Rev. St. § 4904,)
the pre-emption laws, (Id. § 2259,) and in the mining laws, (Id. § ,2289,) where
certain privileges are conferred on citizens of the United States, and
“those who have declared their intention to become such,” in no way militates
against, but strongly supports, the correctness of our conclusion, because, if
foreign-born residents, by declaring their intention to become citizens, could
ipso facto become such, it would have been futile to name them in all of these
acts as a class distinct from our citizens. That Congress has, by various
special acts, many of which are referred to in the opinion of Chief Justice
Fuller in Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 158, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, naturalized
certain classes of persons who had not complied with the terms of the general
laws on this subject, is not important here, because the plaintiff is not a
member of any class thus naturalized. Nor is the decision in Boyd v.
Nebraska, supra, in point in this case because Gov. Boyd was there held to be
one of a class of foreign-born residents that was naturalized by the acts of
Congress admitting the state of Nebraska into the Union. These acts conferred
the rights of citizenship upon foreign-born residents of Nebraska who had
declared their intention to become citizens. The plaintiff was a resident of
Minnesota.
A single
argument remains to be noticed, and that is that the state of Minnesota has
conferred on plaintiff the elective franchise, the right to hold any office
in its gift, and, in reality, all the rights and privileges of citizenship
in its power to bestow; and therefore it is said he is a citizen of that
state, and not a foreign subject, and the federal court has no jurisdiction
of this action. It may be conceded that a state may confer on foreign citizens
or subjects all the rights and privileges it has the power to bestow,
but, when it has done all this, it has not naturalized them. They are foreign
citizens or subjects still, within the meaning of the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and the jurisdiction of the federal courts over
controversies between them and citizens of the states is neither enlarged nor
restricted by the acts of the state. The power to naturalize foreign subjects
or citizens was one of the powers expressly granted by the states to the
national government. By section 8, art. 1, of the constitution of the United
States, it was provided that “the congress shall have the power to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization.” Congress has exercised this power, established
the rule, and expressly declared that foreign-born residents may be naturalized
by a compliance with it, and not otherwise. This power, like the power to
regulate commerce among the states, was carved out of the general sovereign
power held by the states when this nation was formed and granted by the
Constitution to the Congress of the United States. It thus vested exclusively in
Congress, and no power remained in the states to change or vary the rule of
naturalization Congress established, or to authorize any foreign subject to
denationalize himself, and become a citizen of the United States, without a
compliance with the conditions congress had prescribed. Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 19 How. 393, 405; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73; Minor v.
Happersett, 21 How. 162; Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 160, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep.
375,
In like manner, the
states granted to the judiciary of the nation the power to determine a
controversy between a state or citizens thereof and foreign states,
citizens, or subjects, (Const. U.S. art. 3, § 2,) and Congress conferred
that power upon the circuit courts. The extent of the jurisdiction of those
courts is measured by the Constitution and the acts of Congress. A foreign-born
resident, who has not been naturalized according to the acts of Congress, is not
a “citizen” of the United States or of a state, within the definition
given by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, but remains a foreign
subject or citizen; and any controversy between him and a citizen of a
state which involves a sufficient amount is thus clearly within the jurisdiction
of the circuit courts, under any fair construction of the Constitution and laws
of the United States. The jurisdiction thus conferred it is not in the power
of any state, by its legislative or other action, to take away, restrict, or
enlarge, and the action of the state of Minnesota regarding the citizenship of
the plaintiff was not material in this case. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300,
328; Cowless v. Mercer Co. 7 Wall. 118; Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270,
286; Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 239; 6 Sup. Or. Rep. 714; O’Connell v. Reed,
56 Fed. Rep. 531.
The
result is that the power granted to Congress by Article 1, § 8, of the
Constitution of the United States, to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization, is exclusive; and the naturalization laws enacted by Congress in
the exercise of this power constitute the only rule by which a foreign subject
may become a citizen of the United States or of a state, within the
meaning of the federal Constitution and laws. It is not in the power of a state
to denationalize a foreign subject who has not complied with the federal
naturalization laws, and constitute him a citizen of the United States or of a
state, so as to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over a controversy
between him and a citizen of a state, conferred upon them by article 3, § 2, of
the constitution of the United States, and the acts of Congress.
A foreign subject who is
qualified to become a citizen of the United States, under section 2167 of the
Revised Statutes, does not become such by filing his declaration of intention so
to do. That section requires that he shall renounce allegiance to the
sovereignty of which he is a subject, take the oath of allegiance to the
United States, and comply with the other conditions prescribed in the second
and third paragraphs of section 2165 of the Revised Statutes, in order to become
naturalized; and until he does so he remains a foreign subject.
The court below was right in denying the
motion to dismiss this action for want of jurisdiction, and the judgment below
is affirmed, with costs.
Well I hoped you learned
something from reading this case with the correct understand of punctuation and
the word OR. Karl Granse gave me this case when we were researching citizenship
way back in ‘93 or so. I just decided to dig this out when I saw this type
argument posted on the internet the first week in February that was close to
this. Wow, just think, the word “either” never appeared once in the decision
therefore every time the word “OR” was used it is a conjunction meaning AND.
Since all citizens of the United States have renounced allegiance to the
Sovereign Lord Almighty and given up His citizenship, Eph. 2:19, for another
king/sovereign they are neither Christians for they gave up following the Lord
nor sovereign with any unalienable rights, only conferred rights by the
political establishment. It is that simple. Notice that nowhere were The Lord’s
unalienable Rights ever mentioned, only conferred political Rights which are
always inferior to Natural rights and is the only reason the country runs, on
political rights. Ever hear either the term “politically correct” or “this court
cannot decide your tax case argument because it is a `political issue’?”
Nothing is an unalienable right
because the Crown’s corporation of England still rules American “citizens” as it
did its “subjects” in England. Only the term changed, i.e. we still are slaves
to the feudal (federal) system.
Sincerely,
The Informer
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