May 22, 2017

Maine Inland Fisheries and Wildlife Given Authority Over Turkey Hunting Dates and Bag Limits

An amended bill, LD98, gives the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife authority to set hunting season dates and bag limits on wild turkeys. In addition, the Department can implement special hunts for wild turkeys when it is deemed a necessity.

Each of us will have to decide whether we think granting this authority to the Department is a good thing or a bad thing. But then again, does it really matter if the Department never uses it? For those who are suffering crop damages and/or other livestock or property damage issues, I hope the Commissioner at least opts to implement some special hunts to mitigate the losses.

One report is being spread around the state that an apple orchard company is losing over $1 million a year in crop damage. MDIFW should begin immediately to stop this problem.

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Hearing Focuses on Bills to Protect Property Rights, Increase Federal Transparency

Press Release from the House Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: (I added a link and copy of H.R. 1830 the Water Rights Protection Act)

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 18, 2017

Today, the Subcommittee on Water, Power and Oceans held a legislative hearing on two bills to increase federal transparency, safeguard private and state water rights, and provide certainty to water and power users.

The “Water Rights Protection Act” discussion draft (Rep. Scott Tipton, R-CO) protects state water law and private property rights from future federal takings.

Private water rights holders should not live in fear of the federal government coming after them. Mr. Tipton’s bill is necessary to ensure that privately held water rights cannot be extracted by the federal government in the future as a condition to secure a federal permit,Subcommittee Chairman Doug Lamborn (R-CO) said.

Over many decades, federal attempts to manipulate the federal permit, lease and land management process to circumvent long-established state water law and hijack privately-held water rights have sounded the alarm for all non-federal water users that rely on these water rights for their livelihood. The Water Rights Protection Act is commonsense legislation that provides certainty by upholding longstanding federal deference to state water law,Rep. Tipton stated.

Vice President of the Utah Farm Bureau Randy Parker discussed the water rights issues he sees on the ground everyday as the U.S. Forest Service (FS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) “systematically challeng[e] state sovereignty and historically held water rights on public lands.”

The ongoing protests, claims, coercion and even bullying by agents of the FS and the BLM has created and continues to cause considerable uncertainty for ranching families across the West,” Parker said.

Chris Treese, Manager for External Affairs at the Colorado River Water Conservation District, urged swift passage of the “Water Rights Protection Act” to avoid the inevitable downward spiral of litigation.

Unless the FS commits to respecting Western states’ individual water rights adjudication systems to accomplish its flow-related goals, the only sure outcome is contentious, lengthy and expensive litigation. This is a result in no one’s interest, including the environment,” Treese stated.

H.R. 2371 (Rep. Paul Gosar, R-AZ), the “Western Area Power Administration Transparency Act,” establishes a pilot project to increase the transparency of the Western Area Power Administration’s (WAPA) costs, rates, and other financial and operational dealings for utility ratepayers and taxpayers. Patrick Ledger, CEO of the Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, welcomed the transparency and accountability promoted by this bill in light of the recent trend of increased utility rates.

With better information broken down in key components – and with a historical perspective – customers can have a better dialogue with [WAPA],” Ledger said.This is perhaps the most fundamental benefit that the transparency legislation offers.”

Click here to view full witness testimony.

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Maine’s Nuisance Wild Turkeys

Roll the film! Quiet on the set. Action! The scene begins with a line of people getting ready to board the colorfully decorated 15-passenger van headed out on a wildlife tour. The passengers are obvious city folks – dressed like city folks and acting like city folks – after all who would pay money to go “view” wildlife from a 15-passenger van and 14 other smelly people? I rest my case.

The first stop? Timberlake’s Apple Orchard in Turner…..cut! cut! cut! What to hell is this? The customers are not happy. They have to interest in seeing wild turkeys destroying an apple orchard. And perhaps that is one of the reasons that not enough noise is being made about the wild turkey nuisances that, in the case of the Timberlake’s, is costing them in excess of $1 million in lost produce each year.

It’s the city dwellers, the “Environmentalists” that instill fear in what the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (MDIFW) does. No, no, no. Science no longer dictates the necessities of wildlife management. It’s which group with the most money and the loudest voices who get the oil for the squeaky wheel. Environmentalists don’t care about wild turkeys nor do they care that some family in Turner, Maine is using up THEIR environment and habitat to produce food. After all, to them food is found in a grocery store.

MDIFW caves to the Environmentalists when they demand that the state grow more moose so that city dwellers, who have no skin in the game, can board one of those 15-passenger gas guzzlers (carbon producers – wink, wink) and sip their lattes and hope to gawk out the window and see a moose beside the road mucking themselves up to get out of the torment of the black flies and mosquitoes – even at the expense of increased wildlife diseases and parasites. But we don’t talk about that stuff because that isn’t what animal lovers do.

It appears that now the introduction of wild turkeys back into Maine was such a resounding success (in the eye of the beholder) that the animal has reached a point that it has become a nuisance. Just the simple example of one business losing $1 million in produce a year to turkeys, should be reason enough to start killing turkeys. Environmentalists, who by the way have infiltrated every crevasse of government agencies, including fish and wildlife departments, are probably glad the Timberlakes are losing money and turkeys are an animal, thus all animals should be protected and hunting stopped. Business and food growing is bad to the Environmentalist. So, there you have it.

But it appears that MDIFW, even with new authority to increase bag limits and lengthen hunting seasons on turkeys, doesn’t seem much interested in doing something about the nuisance. I wonder if the public tolerance part of the equation is losing its bite. Where once the ONLY way that something like turkey reintroduction could work is if the public was in support and how long turkeys remained depended on how long that support continued. It appears the support is dwindling faster than a stack of pancakes at Dysarts. If MDIFW waits too long to act, it may be too late.

There have been some changes to the hunting seasons, bag limits and fees charged but that doesn’t seem to have had any effect on the growth of wild turkeys or the number of the critters being harvested. According to George Smith, outdoor writer and political activist, in 2014 his proposed legislation, which passed with amendments, created some changes and gave MDIFW authority and flexibility to mitigate the problem: “The final bill in 2014 reduced the turkey hunting permit to $20 for both residents and nonresidents, with no additional fee for a second tom in the spring, expanded the fall season to the entire month of October and added a second turkey of either sex to the fall bag limit, reduced the tagging fee from $5 to $2 for each turkey (with all of the fee going to the tagging agent), extended the spring season to all-day, and authorized all-day hunting for Youth Day.”

Smith said that even these changes has not solved the turkey problem. Probably a bit understated.

In 2013, before the new legislation described above was enacted, the combined wild turkey harvest for both Spring and Fall hunts was 8,718. Those totals dropped to 7,554 for 2014 and essentially remained unchanged for 2015 adding up to 7,570 birds harvested.

2016 harvest data remains incomplete. The Spring harvest for 2016 was 5,154 turkeys, which when compared with previous years is below the average.

So, yes! Clearly the changes have done nothing to increase the wild turkey harvest, thus reducing the population. So what’ll it be? Is Maine going to fall in line with far too many other states that sit on their hands, fearful of the repercussions from the Environmentalists and allow Maine businesses to go under because of a damned animal? Time will tell but there may not be that much time left.

It would seem to me that given the implementation of more liberal turkey hunting guidelines and showing no results to reducing the wild turkey population, that’s it’s time MDIFW began looking at the turkey as a nuisance and a problem, allowing for harvesting the birds without any special permit or tagging requirement with fees. Set daily bag limits like those of grouse and monitor the situation. If it gets to a point that turkeys begin reaching low levels, adjust the seasons and bag limits to accommodate.

To hell with the Environmentalists. Apple growers and other private farms and business don’t need to be run out of town because perverts want to protect a bird that doesn’t need protection.

Just more of the same nonsense.

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Maine Police Nazi Eavesdrop on Citizens Within Social Media

People, the most of whom refuse to even think that THEIR governments would violate the trust and “listen in” on social media communication, will probably never get it, nor will they probably care.

Computer software, designed to “listen” for key words, such as “fight,” “gun” (wink, wink) etc. provide a red flag in which law enforcement, against the written word of the Bill of Rights, spy on you to see what you are up to….but that’s not an intrusion? Oh, yeah! That’s right! You are one of those who bought the lie, hook, line and sinker, that the Patriot Act was also a good and necessary thing.

And what? It should come as a surprise that local and state police in the Pine Tree State are spying on the people? The Federal Government has been doing it for some time now and evidently we like it a lot because we don’t do anything about it. We are told this computer software being used to intrude on citizens was funded by the CIA. GET A CLUE?

A spokesman for the city of South Portland said how their police uses the computer software isn’t prying into personal matters. Oh really? He follows this up by stating the obvious lie: “Most of the hits we get are someone going hunting and talking about their shotgun, so we get some nice pictures of a freshly killed deer.”

Evidently “someone going hunting and talking about their shotgun” being spied on by Police Nazis isn’t prying into their personal matters.

But you keep on using the most destructive tool in America today, Facebook, and above all……

DON’T GO LOOK!

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Maine House Fearful of Lawsuits Passes Bill to Allow “Religious” People to Forego Wearing Blaze Orange

The Maine House has passed, 120-27, LD 426 that provides anyone who cannot wear bright colored clothing while firearms hunting for deer, to discard it and instead wear some kind of red clothing – some kind because what that red is has not been determined.

Many other things in the bill, whose sponsor was quoted as saying, “I feel that failure to do so will almost certainly lead to a legal confrontation between the state of Maine and this group of Amish people”…, were not spelled out and leaves wide open many issues, some of which could be potentially serious.

If the Senate passes and the Governor signs this bill, it appears anyone can hunt deer with firearms and forego wearing blaze orange and replace it with red. If questioned simply tell the warden it’s for religious reasons. Who is going to prove one way or another. Does this bill clearly point out that you have to be an active member of a recognized “religious” order or sect to qualify? And now wouldn’t that open up a can of worms!

And what about liability. Yes, Maine law states that a hunter is responsible to know his target before shooting. But what if there is an accident anyway. Is the shooter exempt from liability because, unlike all other hunters, a “religious” hunter isn’t wearing the required hunter orange?

So, what does this say about the years of process and development of Maine hunter safety rules. Do we toss those out the window because of a “religious” belief? If blaze orange is a public safety issue then it is a public safety issue…period.

If Maine is passing this bill, partly due to the fear of lawsuits brought on by the Amish, then is it that they have no fear of a lawsuit brought on by everyone else who feels reverse discrimination?

But what I find of interest, and I suppose a point that nobody wants to speak of (out of fear of a lawsuit for bigotry and/or religious persecution), is that the Amish state that their religion forbids them to wear bright-colored clothing because it draws attention unto them. Really? So is it the bright clothing that is the issue or the fact that attention is being brought on them somehow?

If it’s about the attention, then one could argue that they certainly draw more attention on themselves simply by living a lifestyle that causes people to stop and stare, and sometimes worse than that. And if that isn’t enough, I know when I am out in the woods hunting, and wearing blaze orange because it is REQUIRED by law (and now I will be treated differently) there’s nobody around in the woods that would give a damn what I’m wearing.

In short, none of this makes much sense at all. It just all sounds like a bunch of crap, rooted in the fear of some sort of lawsuit, to go overboard with “religious” tolerance. Which brings me to another point. If it’s the attention they are trying to avoid, what kind of attention have they already brought on themselves by pushing this law and what more attention, probably national, would they bring on themselves if they filed a lawsuit?

I call BS!

Personally I don’t care. I really don’t. Under certain circumstances I would like to be able to hunt without blaze orange. Now, I guess I can because I just found “religion.”

 

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Law of Nations Chap. VI. Right of Embassy

CHAP. VI.
OF THE RIGHT OF EMBASSY, OR THE RIGHT OF SENDING AND RECEIVING PUBLIC MINISTERS.

§ 55. It is necessary that nations be enabled to treat and communicate together.

IT is necessary that nations should treat and hold intercourse together, in order to promote their interests, — to avoid injuring each other, — and to adjust and terminate their disputes. And as they all he under the indispensable obligation of giving their consent and concurrence to whatever conduces to the general advantage and welfare (Prelim. § 13) — of procuring the means of accommodating and terminating their differences (Book II. § 323, &c.) — and as each has a right to every thing which her preservation requires (Book I. § 18) — to every thing which can promote her perfection without injuring others (Ib. § 23), as also to the necessary means of fulfilling her duties, — it results from the premises, that each nation is at once possessed of the right to treat and communicate with others, and bound by reciprocal obligation to consent to such communication as far as the situation of her affairs will permit her.

§ 56. They do this by the agency of public ministers.

But nations or sovereign states do not treat together immediately: and their rulers or sovereigns cannot well come to a personal conference in order to treat of their affairs. Such interviews would often be impracticable; and, exclusive of delays, trouble, expense, and so many other inconveniences, it is rarely, according to the observation of Philip de Commines, that any good effect could be expected from them. The only expedient, therefore, which remains for nations and sovereigns, is to communicate and treat with each other by the agency of procurators or mandatories, — of delegates charged with their commands, and vested with their powers, — that is to say, public ministers. This term, in its more extensive and general sense, denotes any person intrusted with the management of public affairs, but is more particularly understood to designate one who acts in such capacity at a foreign court.

At present there are several orders of public ministers, and in the sequel we shall speak of them; but whatever difference custom has introduced between them, the essential character is common to them all; I mean that of minister, and in some sort, representative of a foreign power, — a person charged with the commands of that power, and delegated to manage his affairs: and that quality is sufficient for our present purpose.

§ 57. Every sovereign

Every sovereign state then has a right to send and to receive public ministers; for they are necessary instruments in the management of those affairs which sovereigns have to transact with each other, and the channels of that correspondence which they have a right to carry on. In the first chapter of this work may be seen who are those sovereigns, and what those independent states, that are entitled to rank in the great society of nations. They are the powers to whom belongs the right of embassy.

§ 58. An unequal alliance, or a treaty of protection, does not take away this right.

An unequal alliance, or even a treaty of protection, not being incompatible with sovereignty (Book I. §§ 5, 6), — such treaties do not of themselves deprive a state of the right of sending and receiving public ministers. If the inferior ally or the party protected has not expressly renounced the right of entertaining connections and treating with other powers, he necessarily retains that of sending ministers to them, and of receiving their ministers in turn. The same rule applies to such vassals and tributaries as are not subjects (Book I. §§ 7,8).

§ 59. Right of the princes and states of the empire in this respect.

Nay more, this right may even belong to princes or communities not possessed of sovereign power; for the rights whose assemblage constitutes the plenitude of sovereignly, are not indivisible: and if, by the constitution of the state, by the concession of the sovereign, or by reservations which the subjects have made with him, a prince or community remains possessed of any one of those rights which usually belong to the sovereign alone, such prince or community may exercise it, and avail themselves of it in all its effects and all its natural or necessary consequences, unless they have been formally excepted. Though the princes and states of the empire are dependent on the emperor and the empire, yet they are sovereign in many respects; and as the constitutions of the empire secure to them the right of treating with foreign powers and contracting alliances with them, they incontestably have also that of sending and receiving public ministers. The emperors, indeed, when they felt themselves able to carry their pretensions very high, have sometimes disputed that right, or at least attempted to render the exercise of it subject to the control of their supreme authority, — insisting that their permission was necessary to give it a sanction. But since the peace of Westphalia, and by means of the imperial capitulations, the princes and states of Germany have been able to maintain themselves in the possession of that right; and they have secured to themselves so many other rights, that the empire is now considered as a republic of sovereigns.

§ 60. Cities that have the right of banner.

There are even cities which are and which acknowledge themselves to be in a state of subjection, that have nevertheless a right to receive the ministers of foreign powers, and to send them deputies, since they have a right to treat with them. This latter circumstance is the main point upon which the whole question turns; for whosoever has a right to the end, has a right to the moans. It would be absurd to acknowledge the right of negotiating and treating, and to contest the necessary means of doing it. Those cities of Switzerland, such as Neufchatel and Bienne, which have the right of banner, have, by natural consequence, a right to treat with foreign powers, although the cities in question be subject to the dominion of a prince: for the right of banner, or of arms, comprehends that of granting succours of troops,1 provided such grants be not inconsistent with the service of the prince. Now, if those cities are entitled to grant troops, they must necessarily be at liberty to listen to the applications made to them on the subject by a foreign power, and to treat respecting the conditions. Hence it follows that they may also depute an agent to him for that purpose, or receive his ministers. And as they are at the same time vested with the administration of their own internal police, they have it in their power to insure respect to such foreign ministers as come to them. What is here said of the rights of those cities is confirmed by ancient and constant practice. However exalted and extraordinary such rights may appear, they will not be thought strange, if it be considered that those very cities were already possessed of extensive privileges at the time when their princes were themselves dependent on the emperors, or on other liege lords who were immediate vassals of the empire. When the princes shook off the yoke of vassalage, and established themselves in a state of perfect independence, the considerable cities in their territories made their own conditions; and instead of rendering their situation worse, it was very natural that they should take hold of existing circumstances, in order to secure to themselves a greater portion of freedom and happiness. Their sovereigns cannot now advance any plea in objection to the terms on which those cities consented to follow their fortunes and to acknowledge them as their only superiors.

§ 61. Ministers of viceroys.

Viceroys and chief governors of a sovereignty or remote province have frequently the right of sending and receiving public ministers; but, in that particular, they act in the name and by the authority of the sovereign whom they represent, and whose rights they exercise. That entirely depends on the will of the master by whom they are delegated. The viceroy of Naples, the governors of Milan, and the governors-general of the Netherland for Spain, were invested with such power.

§ 62. Ministers of the nation or of the regents during an interregnum.

The right of embassy, like all the other rights of sovereignty, originally resides in the nation as its principal and primitive subject. During an interregnum, the exercise of that right reverts to the nation, or devolves on those whom the laws have invested with the regency of the state. They may send ministers in the same manner as the sovereign used to do; and these ministers possess the same rights as were enjoyed by those of the sovereign. The republic of Poland sends ambassadors while her throne is vacant: nor would she suffer that they should be treated with less respect and consideration than those who are sent while she has a king, Cromwell effectually maintained the ambassadors of England in the same rank and respectability which they possessed under the regal authority.

§ 63. Of him who molests another in the exercise of the right of embassy.

Such being the rights of nations, a sovereign who attempts to hinder another from sending and receiving public ministers, does him an injury, and offends against the law of nations. It is attacking a nation in one of her most valuable rights, and disputing her title to that which nature herself gives to every independent society: it is offering an insult to nations in general, and tearing asunder the ties by which they are united.

§ 64. What is allowable in this respect in time of war.

But this is to be understood only of a time of peace; war introduces other rights. It allows us to cut off from an enemy all his resources, and to hinder him from sending ministers to solicit assistance. There are even occasions when we may refuse a passage to the ministers of neutral nations, who are going to our enemy. We are under no obligation to allow them an opportunity of perhaps conveying him intelligence of a momentous nature, and concerting with him the means of giving him assistance, &c. This admits of no doubt, for instance, in the case of a besieged town. No right can authorize the minister of a neutral power or any other person whatsoever, to enter the place without the besieger’s consent. But, in order to avoid giving offence to sovereigns, good reasons must be alleged for refusing to let their ministers pass; and with such reasons they must rest satisfied, if they are disposed to remain neuter. Sometimes even a passage is refused to suspected ministers in critical and dubious junctures, although there do not exist any open war. But this is a delicate proceeding, which, if not justified by reasons that are perfectly satisfactory, produces an acrimony that easily degenerates into an open rupture.

§ 65. The minister of a friendly power is to be received.

As nations are obliged to correspond together, to attend to the proposals and demands made to them, to keep open a free and safe channel of communication for the purpose of mutually understanding each other’s views and bringing their disputes to an accommodation, a sovereign cannot, without very particular reasons, refuse admitting and hearing the minister of a friendly power, or of one with whom he is at peace. But in case there be reasons for not admitting him into the heart of the country, he may notify to him that he will send proper persons to meet him at an appointed place on the frontier, there to hear his proposals. It then becomes the foreign minister’s duty to stop at the place assigned: it is sufficient that he obtains a hearing; that being the utmost that he has a right to expect.

§ 66. Of resident ministers.

The obligation, however, does not extend so far as to include that of suffering at all times the residence of perpetual ministers, who are desirous of remaining at the sovereign’s court, although they have no business to transact with him. It is natural, indeed, and perfectly conformable to the sentiments which nations ought mutually to entertain for each other, that a friendly reception should be given to those resident ministers, when there is no inconvenience to be apprehended from their slay. But if there exist any substantial reason to the contrary, the advantage of the state undoubtedly claims a preference; and the foreign sovereign cannot take it amiss if his minister be requested to withdraw, when he has fulfilled the object of his commission, or when he has not any business to transact. The custom of keeping every where ministers constantly resident is now so firmly established, that whoever should refuse to conform to it, must allege very good reasons for his conduct, if he wishes to avoid giving offence. These reasons may arise from particular conjunctures: but there are also ordinary reasons ever subsisting, and such as relate to the constitution of a government and the state of a nation. Republics would often have very good reasons of the latter kind, to excuse themselves from continually suffering the residence of foreign ministers, who corrupt the citizens, — gain them over to their masters, to the great detriment of the republic, — and excite and foment parties in the state, &c. And even though no other evil should arise from their presence than that of inspiring a nation, originally plain, frugal, and virtuous, with a taste for luxury, the thirst of gain, and the manners of courts, — that alone would be more than sufficient to justify the conduct of wise and provident rulers in dismissing them. The Polish government is not fond of resident ministers; and indeed their intrigues with the members of the diet have furnished but too many reasons for keeping them at a distance. In the war of 1666, a nuncio publicly complained, in the open diet, of the French ambassador’s unnecessarily prolonging his stay in Poland, and declared that he ought to be considered as a spy. In 1668, other members of that body moved for a law to regulate the length of time that an ambassador should be allowed to remain in the kingdom.2

§ 67. How the ministers of an enemy are to be admitted.

The greater calamities of war are, the more it is incumbent on nations to preserve means for putting an end to it. Hence it becomes necessary, that, even in the midst of hostilities, they be at liberty to send ministers to each other, for the purpose of making overtures of peace, or proposals tending to moderate the transports of hostile rage. It is true, indeed, that the minister of an enemy cannot come without permission; accordingly, a passport, or safe-conduct, is asked for him, either through the intervention of some common friend, or by one of those messengers who are protected by the laws of war, and of whom we shall speak in the sequel — I mean a trumpeter or drummer. It is true, also, that, for substantial reasons, the safe-conduct may be refused, and admission denied to the minister. But this liberty, which is authorized by the care that every nation is bound to bestow on her own safety, is no bar to our laying it down as a general maxim, that we are not to refuse admitting and hearing an enemy’s minister; that is to say, that war alone, and of itself, is not a sufficient reason for refusing to hear any proposal coming from an enemy; but that, to warrant such refusal, there must exist some reason of a particular nature, and which rests upon very good grounds, as, for instance, when an artful and designing enemy has, by his own conduct, given us just cause to apprehend that his only intention, in sending his ministers and making proposals, is to disunite the members of a confederacy, to lull them into security by holding out false appearances of peace, and then to overpower them by surprise.

§ 68. Whether ministers may be received from or sent to an usurper.

Before we conclude this chapter, it will be proper to discuss a celebrated question, which has been often debated. It is asked whether foreign nations may receive the ambassadors and other ministers of an usurper, and send their ministers to him? In this particular, foreign powers take for their rule the circumstance of actual possession, if the-interest of their affairs so require: and, indeed, there cannot be a more certain rule, or one that is more agreeable to the law of nations and the independency of states. As foreigners have no right to interfere in the domestic concerns of a nation, they are not obliged to canvass and scrutinize her conduct in the management of them, in order to determine how far it is either just or unjust. They may, if they think proper, suppose the right to be annexed to the possession. When a nation has expelled her sovereign, other powers, who do not choose to declare against her, and to risk the consequences of her enmity or open hostility, consider her thenceforward as a free and sovereign state, without taking on themselves to determine whether she has acted justly in withdrawing from her allegiance to the prince by whom she was governed. Cardinal Mazarin received Lockhart, whom Cromwell had sent as ambassador from the republic of England, and refused to see either King Charles the Second, or his ministers. If a people, after having expelled their prince, submit to another — if they change the order of succession, and acknowledge a sovereign to the prejudice of the natural and appointed heir — foreign powers may, in this instance also, consider what has been done as lawful: it is no quarrel or business of theirs. At the beginning of the last century, Charles, Duke of Sudermania, having obtained the crown of Sweden, to the prejudice of his nephew Sigismund, king of Poland, was soon acknowledged by most sovereigns. Villeroy, minister of the French monarch, Henry the Fourth, in his dispatches of the 8th of April, 1608, plainly said to the president, Jeanin, “All these reasons and considerations shall not prevent the king from treating with Charles, if he finds it to be his interest, and that of his kingdom.” This remark was sensible and judicious. The king of France was neither the judge nor the guardian of the Swedish nation, that he should, contrary to the interests of his own kingdom, refuse to acknowledge the king whom Sweden had chosen, under pretence that a competitor had termed Charles an usurper. Had the charge been even founded injustice, it was an affair which did not fall under the cognizance of foreigners.

Therefore, when foreign powers have received the ministers of an usurper, and sent theirs to him, the lawful prince, on recovering the throne, cannot complain of these measures as an injury, nor justly make them the ground of a war, provided those powers have not proceeded to greater lengths, nor furnished any assistance against him. But to acknowledge the dethroned prince or his heir, after the state has solemnly acknowledged the person to whom the sceptre has been transferred, is an injury done to the latter, and a profession of enmity to the nation that has chosen him. Such a step, hazarded in favour of James the Second’s son, was, by William the Third and the British nation, alleged as one of the principal reasons of the war which England soon after declared against France. Notwithstanding all the caution, and all the protestations of Louis the Fourteenth, his acknowledgment of young Stuart, as king of England, Scotland, and Ireland, under the title of James the Third, was considered by the English as an injury done both to the king and to the nation.


1. See the History of the Helvetic Confederacy, by M. de Watteville.

2. Wiquefort’s Ambassador, b. i. § 1.

 

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If Climate Change is “Settled Science” Why Do We Continue to Research?

That’s essentially what Joe Bastardi says in his contribution opinion piece to the Patriot Post, suggesting that Congress should take the money budgeted for Climate Change research and give it to cover the costs of “preconditions” within the communist health care plans (fake) being proposed by Congress (fake).

Being that we live is a world that is 100% post normal and there is no longer any discussion about why in hell are we being robbed of the money we work our asses off for so that Congress can continue to pay Big Corporations and Big Pharma and suggest levying more taxes to cover fake things that the fat cats don’t want to pay for?

How about this suggestion for all you communist/socialists who LOVE your damned servitude – LET’S DEFUND CONGRESS AND SEND THEM ALL TO HELL!!

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Guns and the Left’s Unfailing Insistence on Irrational Thought

This morning I was reading an article from a Maine Online publication about how the Legislature is going to consider a bill that would make it impossible for a convicted felon to own a muzzle-loading weapon, i.e. black powder gun. As I understand the current law, the Federal Government does not recognize a muzzle-loading gun as an official weapon. In Maine, where it is generally unlawful for a convicted felon to own even a muzzle-loading gun, he or she can make application to the State’s Commissioner of Public Safety for an exemption to that prohibition.

The argument in favor of the new proposed law, as presented by this newspaper, is a poor one and certainly exemplifies the irrational thoughts of leftist progressives. I’m not here to argue whether this law is good or bad, right or wrong, and whether or not a muzzle-loading gun is or is not a weapon. I’m here to expose the irrational thought that drives emotions when it comes to making decisions – such as the banning of guns or the making of irrational and useless laws.

This newspaper uses as the foundation of it’s argument is an event that happened in Maine 10 years ago, when a hunter, hunting with a muzzle-loading rifle, mistook his target and shot and killed a woman in the field behind her house. It was a tragic event. Maine law is very strict about the responsibility of the hunter to identify the target. Such was not the case here and it ended in unnecessary tragedy.

The hunter was not a “dangerous felon.” As a matter of fact he wasn’t even a felon. If memory serves me, the man had no criminal record and was a decent man within his community. His crime? Poor judgement and decision making. To err is human.

So, to a rational thinker, would this proposed new law, had it been in effect at the time, have prevented the death of an innocent young woman? Of course not.

However, under present law, the convicted felon can petition the Commissioner of Public Safety to allow an exemption of the state’s ban against felons owning a muzzle-loading gun. Should this felon be granted an exemption? I dunno, however, can any of us make that determination without knowing what the guidelines and requirements are that must be met before the Commissioner can permit such an exemption? Is this a clear cut case of forever banning this man from ever owning a gun? You’ll have to decide that. Forever is a long time. How long should he be punished?

The point here is that the proposed law is nonsense. It’s nonsense because it is stating in outright fashion that when the State of Maine made it’s current law allowing for exemptions, those making the law didn’t know what they were doing and that the process is flawed so that “dangerous felons” can have easy access to a gun.

Another question to ask is, how many exemptions have been granted by the Commissioner of Public Safety and how many, if there are any, of those exemptions resulted in crime committed with a muzzle-loading gun? A criminal is a criminal and criminals most often are criminals because they had total disregard of laws, such as the one being proposed.

Unless there is ample proof that the system in place is allowing for violent crimes that might have been prevented, this proposal is nothing more than Leftist piling on of totalitarian repression – emotional clap-trap.

Enough already.

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The Status of the Law of Nations In Early American Law

It should be clear who a Nation/State belongs to and who it does not belong to…
[Sylvester, supra note 55, at 67; see also Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 823 (1989) (“In ascertaining principles of the law of nations, lawyers and judges of that era relied heavily on continental treatise writers, Vattel being the most often consulted by Americans. An essential part of a sound legal education consisted of reading Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui, among others.”).]
Below is what Vattel and the Law of Nations has to say…
“The law of nations is the law of sovereigns. It is principally for them, and for their ministers, that it ought to be written. All mankind are indeed interested in it; and, in a free country, the study of its maxims is a proper employment for every citizen; but it would be of little consequence to impart the knowledge of it only to private individuals, who are not called to the councils of nations, and who have no influence in directing the public measures. If the conductors of slates, if all those who are employed in public affairs, condescended to apply seriously to the study of a science which ought to be their law, and, as it were, the compass by which to steer their course, what happy effects might we not expect from a good treatise on the law of nations! We every day feel the advantages of a good body of laws in civil society: — the law of nations is, in point of importance, as much superior to the civil law, as the proceedings of nations and sovereigns are more momentous in their consequences than those of private persons….”
“…But fatal experience too plainly proves how little regard those who are at the head of affairs pay to the dictates of justice, in conjunctures where they hope to find their advantage. Satisfied with bestowing their attention on a system of politics which is often false, since often unjust, the generality of them think they have done enough when they have thoroughly studied that. Nevertheless, we may truly apply to states a maxim which has long been acknowledged as true with respect to individuals, — that the best and safest policy is that which is founded on virtue. Cicero, as a great master in the art of government as in eloquence and philosophy, does not content himself with rejecting the vulgar maxim, that “a state cannot be happily governed without committing injustice;” he even proceeds so far as to lay down the very reverse of the proposition as an invariable truth, and maintains, that “without a strict attention to the most rigid justice, public affairs cannot be advantageously administered.”
Providence occasionally bestows on the world kings and ministers whose minds are impressed with this great truth. Let us not renounce the pleasing hope that the number of those wise conductors of nations will one day be multiplied; and in the interim let us, each in his own sphere, exert our best efforts to accelerate the happy period.”~[Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations]
From: The Law of Nations; Preliminaries: (This is what “States should be attain­ing” and this will give you a clue about what “all indi­vid­uals in a State” should be striv­ing for.)

§ 4. In what light nations or states are to be considered.

Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before the establishment of civil societies, lived together in the state of nature, — Nations, or sovereign states, are to be considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature.
It is a settled point with writers on the natural law, that all men inherit from nature a perfect liberty and independence, of which they cannot be deprived without their own consent. In a State, the individual citizens do not enjoy them fully and absolutely, because they have made a partial surrender of them to the sovereign. But the body of the nation, the State, remains absolutely free and independent with respect to all other men, and all other Nations, as long as it has not voluntarily submitted to them.

§ 10. Society established by nature between all mankind

Man is so formed by nature, that he cannot supply all his own wants, but necessarily stands in need of the intercourse and assistance of his fellow-creatures, whether for his immediate preservation, or for the sake of perfecting his nature, and enjoying such a life as is suitable to a rational being. This is sufficiently proved by experience. We have instances of persons, who, having grown up to manhood among the bears of the forest, enjoyed not the use of speech or of reason, but were, like the brute beasts, possessed only of sensitive faculties. We see moreover that nature has refused to bestow on men the same strength and natural weapons of defence with which she has furnished other animals — having, in lieu of those advantages, endowed mankind with the faculties of speech and reason, or at least a capability of acquiring them by an intercourse with their fellow-creatures. Speech enables them to communicate with each other, to give each other mutual assistance, to perfect their reason and knowledge; and having thus become intelligent, they find a thousand methods of preserving themselves, and supplying their wants. Each individual, moreover, is intimately conscious that he can neither live happily nor improve his nature without the intercourse and assistance of others. Since, therefore, nature has thus formed mankind, it is a convincing proof of her intention that they should communicate with, and mutually aid and assist each other.
Hence is deduced the establishment of natural society among men. The general law of that society is, that each individual should do for the others every thing which their necessities require, and which he can perform without neglecting the duty that he owes to himself: (4) a law which all men must observe in order to live in a manner consonant to their nature, and conformable to the views of their common Creator — a law which our own safety, our happiness, our dearest interests, ought to render sacred to every one of us. Such is the general obligation that binds us to the observance of our duties: let us fulfil them with care, if we would wisely endeavour to promote our own advantage. (5)

§ 14. Of the preservation and perfection of a nation.

He who no longer exists can have no duties to perform: and a moral being is charged with obligations to himself, only with a view to his perfection and happiness: for to preserve and to perfect his own nature, is the sum of all his duties to himself.
The preservation of a nation is found in what renders it capable of obtaining the end of civil society; and a nation is in a perfect state, when nothing necessary is wanting to arrive at that end. We know that the perfection of a thing consists, generally, in the perfect agreement of all its constituent parts to tend to the same end. A nation being a multitude of men united together in civil society — if in that multitude all conspire to attain the end proposed in forming a civil society, the nation is perfect; and it is more or less so, according as it approaches more or less to that perfect agreement. In the same manner its external state will be more or less perfect, according as it concurs with the interior perfection of the nation,
§ 21. A nation ought to perfect itself and the state.
The second general duty of a nation towards itself is to labour at its own perfection and that of its state. It is this double perfection that renders a nation capable of attaining the end of civil society: it would be absurd to unite in society, and yet not endeavour to promote the end of that union.
Here the entire body of a nation, and each individual citizen, are bound by a double obligation, the one immediately proceeding from nature, and the other resulting from their reciprocal engagements. Nature lays an obligation upon each man to labour after his own perfection; and in so doing, he labours after that of civil society, which could not fail to be very flourishing, were it composed of none but good citizens. But the individual finding in a well-regulated society the most powerful succours to enable him to fulfil the task which Nature imposes upon him in relation to himself, for becoming better, and consequently more happy — he is doubtless obliged to contribute all in his power to render that society more perfect.
All the citizens who form a political society reciprocally engage to advance the common welfare, and as far as possible to promote the advantage of each member. Since then the perfection of the society is what enables it to secure equally the happiness of the body and that of the members, the grand object of the engagements and duties of a citizen is to aim at this perfection, This is more particularly the duty of the body collective in all their common deliberations, and in everything they do as a body. (18)
End Law of Nations; Below Citizen defined..
Section 1; 14th Amendement;
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, AND SUBJECT to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”Definition of subject
1 :  one that is placed under authority or control: such asa :  vassalb (1) :  one subject to a monarch and governed by the monarch’s law (2) :  one who lives in the territory of, enjoys the protection of, and owes allegiance to a sovereign power or state

subject (v.)
late 14c., “to make (a person or nation) subject to another by force,” also “to render submissive or dependent,” from Medieval Latin subiectare “place beneath,” frequentative of Latin subicere “to make subject, subordinate” (see subject (n.)). Meaning “to lay open or expose to (some force or occurrence)” is recorded from early 15c. (implied in subjected). Related: Subjecting.
subject (n.)
early 14c., “person under control or dominion of another,” specifically a government or ruler, from Old French sogit, suget, subget “a subject person or thing” (12c., Modern French sujet), from noun use of Latin subiectus “lying under, below, near bordering on,” figuratively “subjected, subdued,” past participle of subicere, subiicere “to place under, throw under, bind under; to make subject, subordinate,” from sub “under” (see sub-) + combining form of iacere “to throw” (see jet (v.)). In 14c., sugges, sogetis, subgit, sugette; form re-Latinized in English 16c.

Meaning “person or thing regarded as recipient of action, one that may be acted upon” is recorded from 1590s. Grammatical sense is recorded from 1630s, from Latin subjectum “grammatical subject,” noun use of the neuter of the Latin past participle. Likewise some restricted uses in logic and philosophy are borrowed directly from Latin subjectum as “foundation or subject of a proposition,” a loan-translation of Aristotle’s to hypokeimenon. Meaning “subject matter of an art or science” is attested from 1540s, probably short for subject matter (late 14c.), which is from Medieval Latin subjecta materia, a loan translation of Greek hypokeimene hyle (Aristotle), literally “that which lies beneath.”

allegiance (n.)
“ties or obligations of a citizen or subject to a government or sovereign,” late 14c., formed in English from Anglo-French legaunce “loyalty of a liege-man to his lord,” from Old French legeance, from liege (see liege (adj.)). Corrupted in spelling by confusion with the now-obsolete legal term allegeance “alleviation, mitigation” (for which see allay (v.)). General figurative sense of “recognition of claims to respect or duty, observance of obligation” is attested from 1732. French allégeance in this sense is said to be from English.

liege (adj.)
c. 1300, of lords, “entitled to feudal allegiance and service,” from Anglo-French lige (late 13c.), Old French lige “liege-lord,” noun use of an adjective meaning “free, giving or receiving fidelity” (corresponding to Medieval Latin ligius, legius), a word of uncertain origin. Perhaps from Late Latin laeticus “cultivated by serfs,” from laetus “serf,” which probably is from Proto-Germanic *lethiga- “freed” (source also of Old English læt “half-freedman, serf;” Old High German laz, Old Frisian lethar “freedman;” Middle Dutch ledich “idle, unemployed”), from PIE root *le- (2) “let go, slacken” (see let (v.)). Or the Middle English word might be directly from Old High German leidig “free,” on the notion of “free from obligation to service except as vassal to one lord,” but this reverses the notion contained in the word.

From late 14c. of vassals, “bound to render feudal allegiance and service.” The dual sense of the adjective reflects the reciprocal relationship it describes: protection in exchange for service. Hence, liege-man “a vassal sworn to the service and support of a lord, who in turn is obliged to protect him” (mid-14c.).

-ance
word-forming element attached to verbs to form abstract nouns of process or fact (convergence from converge), or of state or quality (absence from absent); ultimately from Latin -antia and -entia, which depended on the vowel in the stem word, from PIE *-nt-, adjectival suffix.
Definition of -ance
1 :  action or process furtherance :  instance of an action or process performance
2 :  quality or state :  instance of a quality or state protuberance
3 :  amount or degree conductance

I can keep going with this.. Corpus Juris Secundem Citizen defined backs this up also..

Interesting how they established freedom by enslaving everyone else…

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Supreme Court Rulings Of The Great American Past

DELOVIO v.
BOIT
C.C.Mass.,1815.
Case No. 3,776, 2 Gall. 398

http://freedom-school.com/admiralty/delovio-v-boit-2-gall-398.pdf

Padelford, Fay & Co vs. The Mayor and Alderman of the City of Savannah

The courts decided in a little talked about case that the constitution is private compact and individual citizens had no rights to it. That comment is found on page 6 and 45.

Delovio

Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
32 U.S. 243 (1833)

Primary Holding
The Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government rather than state or local governments, since there is no textual evidence to support a different view.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/32/243/case.html

Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators
3 U.S. 54 (1795)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/3/54/case.html

RESPUBLICA v. SWEERS
1 U.S. 41 (1779)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/1/41/case.html

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